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POSTSCRIPTS

Mental Disorders and Criminal
Responsibility*
The difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory standard of criminal responsibility
when mental disorders are involved is a
task which continues to disquiet both bench
and bar. Although modern psychiatry has
made great strides in the past century in
its investigation of the basic connections
between mental disorders and the subjective element of crime, the translation of
this newly-acquired knowledge into a workable legal standard has eluded the lawmakers. Hence, the nineteenth century
"right-wrong test," supplemented in some
jurisdictions by the so-called "irresistible
impulse" rule, remains the most acceptable
standard of criminal responsibility in the
United States.
But the general acceptance accorded the
"right-wrong test" has not resulted in diminishing criticism of its adequacy, more often
than not on the ground that it fails to take
account of the new knowledge concerning
mental disorders. It was, in fact, this very
type of criticism which prompted the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia to
adopt the so-called Durham' rule in 1954.
In its most fundamental form the Durham
rule stated that an accused was not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was
*See Mental Disease and Criminal Responsibility
- a two part Symposium, 4 CATHOLIC LAWYER 294
(1958); 5 CATHOLiC LAWYER 3 (1959). See also
7 CATHOLIC LAWYER 64 (1961).

1 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).

the product of a mental disease or a mental
defect. 2 Acclaimed in some quarters as a
"step towards enlightened justice' '3 and criticized in others as "vague" and "ill-defined," '4 the standard nonetheless prevails
in the District of Columbia though with
certain misgivings as the recent case of
Blocker v. United States' indicates.
In the Blocker case the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia sitting en
banc reversed a murder conviction on the
ground that the giving of contradictory instructions to the jury resulted in improperly
placing the burden on the defendant of
establishing his defense of insanity. But the
significance of the case stems not from its
holding, but rather from an elaborately
documented concurring opinion in which
Circuit Judge Burger 6 assails certain "mechanical and restrictive aspects" of the
Durham test for determining criminal responsibility. Characterizing the Durham
opinion as "a wrong step but in the right
direction. .. "7 Judge Burger contended
2 The distinction between a disease and a defect
as used in the Durham rule is that the former is
capable of improvement or deterioration, while

the latter is not.
3 See, e.g., Zilboorg, A Step Toward Enlightened
Justice, 22 U. CH. L. REV. 331 (1953).
4 See, e.g., Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal
Responsibility, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 373
(1955).
5 288 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1961).

6Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 857
(D.C. Cir. 1961) (concurring opinion). Chief
Judge Miller and Circuit Judge Bastian joined in
the views expressed by Circuit Judge Burger al-

though dissenting as to the particular case. Id. at

872.
7 Id. at

858.

7
that in giving instructions to the jury concerning insanity the court had lost sight of
the "basic idea that man should be held
criminally responsible for his voluntary acts
resulting from the exercise of his will."
Referring to the Durham rule as the "disease-product" test, and using the word
"disease" to encompass both mental diseases and mental defects, Judge Burger
argued that the terms "disease" and "defect" were distinguishable solely on the
ground that the former was not a static
mental condition while the latter was, and
hence that neither term had any real legal
definition or content. He contended that a
jury as a practical matter had to adopt the
differing meanings given those terms by expert witnesses, and he concluded that "no
rule of law can possibly be sound or workable which is dependent upon the terms
of another discipline whose members are
in profound disagreement about what those
terms mean." 9
Turning to the term, "product," Judge
Burger labeled it inadequate and stated
that:
[A]ssuming arguendo that a criminal act can
be the product of a "mental disease" that
fact should not per se excuse the defendant; it should exculpate only if the condition
described as a "mental disease" affected him
so substantially that he could not appreciate the nature of the illegal act or could not
10
control his conduct.
The Judge also was very critical of the
role of experts in the administration of the
Durham rule, and viewed the problem as
"one of the soundness of a rule whose very
terms encourage, if not require, the experts
to state conclusions in the terms of the ultimate issue."' 1 He suggested that the court
8

Ibid.

9Id. at 860.
10 Id. at 862.
11 Id. at 863.
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"firmly prohibit all questions which allow
the experts literally 'to tell the jury how to
'2
decide the case'.
The Judge further noted the "inordinate
number of appeals and appellate opinions"
under the Durham rule, and attributed them
to the "vagueness" of the standard and failure to consider "the elements of recognition
of wrongdoing and capacity to control conduct." Advocating a return to basic postulates of the criminal law, he stated that:
"No test for criminal responsibility can be
adequate if it does not place squarely before the jury the elements of cognition and
'13
capacity to control behavior.
The concurring opinion of Judge Burger
is to some degree indicative of the problem
faced by the courts in attempting to fashion
a standard of criminal responsibility in the
area of mental disorders. The Durham rule
was an effort by the Circuit Court of the
District of Columbia to make better use
of scientific knowledge in questions of mental disorder -a
basis for much of the
dissatisfaction, past and present, with the
"right-wrong test." However, as Judge Burger and others have pointed out, the Durham rule in its practical operation fails
to take proper account of the cognitive element.
The correct direction of Durham was to
broaden the scope of medical inquiry, but
the incorrect step was to try to do this in
terms which ignore the elements of wrong14
doing and capacity to control conduct.
The Durham rule still prevails in the
District of Columbia. But in view of Judge
Burger's opinion and the concurring sentiments of several other judges, it is perhaps
to be expected that a perceptible change
in the nature of the instructions to the jury
12 Ibid.

13 Id. at 867.
14 Id. at 865.
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will be forthcoming, and that more attention
will be paid the elements of cognition and
free will, while at the same time preserving
that facet of the Durham rule which admits
of broader recognition of medical and
scientific knowledge.
Obscenity Statutes and
First Amendment Freedoms
In recent years The Catholic Lawyer
has devoted much attention to the problem
of obscenity1 and the consequent efforts by
the states, in their legitimate roles as protectors and promoters of the public welfare,
to thwart the steadily increasing appearance
on our newsstands of publications with
little "redeeming social value." Although
the states may validly exercise their police
power in the interests of the public welfare,
this power is not without qualification.
Hence, in the area of publications, where
the very precious first amendment freedoms are involved, the inherent police
power of the states often takes a "backseat" to the fundamental constitutional
rights of the individual.
•It seems quite well-settled that obscene
publications are not protected by the first
amendment. But the distinction between
obscenity and the advocacy of unconventional or unpopular ideas, which are protected, is a "shadow-land" in which courts
and legislatures alike often find themselves
hopelessly lost in a forest of semantics.
The Supreme Court, however, in several
of its decisions has laid down some basic
guide-lines which state legislatures in pre1 Tobin, State and Federal Censorship, 3 CATHO(1957); St. John-Stevas, Obscenity, Literature and the Law, 3 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 301 (1957); Sheerin, Censorship in
Contemporary Society, 3 CATHOLIC LAWYER 292
(1957). See also 3 CATHOLIC LAWYER 180 (1957);'
2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 74 (1956).

paring, or state courts in construing,
statutes somewhat scrupulously follow to
avoid rendering them unconstitutional.
Thus, in Smith v. California,2 the Court
held unconstitutional a California penal
statute which proscribed, and was construed
to impose strict liability for, mere possession
of obscene prints, regardless of the accused's awareness of the contents; and in
Roth v. United States,3 the Court stated
that the test of obscenity was "whether to
the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeals to
prurient interest."'4
Although these decisions provided no
precise definition of obscenity they nonetheless have had a marked effect on state
courts in dealing with obscenity statutes.
This "effect" is very apparent in several
recent decisions of New York's Court of
Appeals interpreting that state's obscenity
statute. In People v. Finkelstein5 the court
was called upon to construe Section 1141
of the Penal Law which provided that: "A
person who sells ... or has in his possession with intent to sell.., any obscene ...
book... [ius guilty of a misdemeanor."
The defendants contended that the statute
was unconstitutional in that it punished for
mere possession, since it did not expressly
require the element of scienter.
In obvious deference to the Smith case,
the Court of Appeals "interpreted" the
statute as implicitly including scienter as
a necessary element for conviction, later
stating that: "In any event, the statute is
at least susceptible of either interpretation,
and we are, therefore, clearly obliged by
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2361 U.S. 147 (1959).
3 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
4 Id. at 489. (Emphasis added.)
5 9 N.Y.2d 342, 174 N.E.2d 470, 214 N.Y.S.2d
363 (1961).

7

statute and decisional law, to embrace that
'6
which will preserve its validity."
The difficult problem of reconciling first
amendment 'freedoms with the public welfare was even more pronounced in People
v. Richmond County News. 7 In that case
the defendants had been convicted of violating section 1141, but the Appellate Division reversed because scienter had not
been proven. In a 4-3 opinion the Court of
Appeals affirmed the reversal, but on the
ground that the magazine involved was not
obscene. The majority opinion recognized
the Roth case as having established "the
broad boundaries of any permissible definition of obscenity under the United States
Constitution ...."s However, it interpreted

section 1141 as applying "only to what may
properly be termed 'hard-core' pornography."9 An indication of what the court
considered "hard-core" pornography is to
be found in a later remark:
6 ld. at -, 174 N.E.2d at 471, 214 N.Y.S.2d at

364-65.
7 Law Report News, vol. 22, no. 39, p. 6 (unrevised
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The fact is, however, that, while the magazine contains many stories or pictures which
are aesthetically tasteless and without any
redeeming social worth, none of them is
pornographic. Numerous pictures and cartoons of nude or semi-nude women and
numerous descriptions and depictions of
sexual arousal and satisfactions are to be
found . . . but it contains nothing which

smacks of sick and blatantly perverse sexuality.' 0
The difference of opinion as to how
serious a limitation first amendment freedoms place on the state's police power is
clearly indicated by the following remark
from the dissenting opinion:
We find nothing in the First Amendment
nor in the language of the Roth case...
which dictates the strict construction of section 1141 now proposed.... By limiting the
applicability of that section only to what [is]
termed "hard-core pornography," we would
be adopting a far more stringent test than is
required under present constitutional standards, and in effect be opening the door to
obscenity so widely as to be tantamount to
a repeal in large measure of section 1141.11

opinion).
8 Id.at p. 7.
9 Id. at p. 8. (Emphasis added.)

1961

10 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

11 Id. at p. 9 (dissenting opinion).
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